The rapid evolution of a robust secondary market for claims against the three largest failed Icelandic banks provides a powerful example of the prompt adaptation of an existing secondary-market legal framework -- originally developed in the US and Europe -- to a complex and novel bankruptcy regime and trading environment.

In our Distressed Investor Alert dated December 23, 2009, we wrote that Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, had returned to the public eye in light of the controversial revisions to Rule 2019 (“Revised Rule 2019”)1 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the "Rules Committee").

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the legal system continues to sort out rights and obligations of financial market participants. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.

The tremendous growth of that largely unregulated market has been accompanied by the development of sophisticated contractual frameworks and specific bankruptcy legislation expressly intended to reduce uncertainty around the amount and type of claims that could ultimately be asserted by market participants following bankruptcy of a derivative counterparty.

T he recent surge in activity in the claims trading market in the wake of Lehman Brothers and other high-profile bankruptcies has created a backlog of open trades and heightened price volatility. This is a perilous combination. The lack of standardized trading documentation and uniform trading conventions, as well as the dramatic influx of new counterparties into the claims market, are factors that have contributed to longer settlement timeframes and increased uncertainty in the market.

On April 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court approved certain amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 requiring disclosures by certain creditors and equity holders in Chapter 11 cases. We expect that amended Rule 20191 (“Amended Rule 2019”) will take effect as a matter of law on December 1, 2011 unless in the interim Congress enacts legislation to reject, modify, or defer the rules, which we view as unlikely.

An important battle about the place of secured lending in the United States economy is set to begin. When the battle ends, fundamental assumptions about the expected recovery rates for defaulted secured loans may change.

An important decision by Judge Kevin Carey of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently focused the distressed debt market (and financial creditors in general) on the proper legal characterization of a common financing provision — the “make-whole premium.”¹ Judge Carey allowed a lender’s claim in bankruptcy for the full amount of a large make-whole premium, after denying a motion by the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee to disallow the claim.

 WHY DOES THIS DECISION MATTER?

Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, has returned to the public eye with a vengeance in light of a recent ruling by the influential Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware¹ and controversial pending amendments to Rule 2019 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the “Rules Committee”). The amendments will be the subject of a public hearing held in New York City on February 5, 2010.²